Institutionalizing alternative economic spaces? An interpretivist perspective on diverse economies by Schulz, Christian. et al.
 1 
 
Krueger, R, Schulz, C and Gibbs, D (2017) Institutionalizing alternative economic spaces?  An 
interpretivist perspective on diverse economies, Progress in Human Geography, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0309132517694530  
 
 I  Introduction 
This paper offers an approach that helps geographers and others from related disciplines to carefully 
and critically reexamine prospects for diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008).  It proposes that an 
interpretative institutionalist perspective (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006) can be useful to elucidate 
opportunities for creating alternative economic visions and practices through revealing the process of 
‘meaning making’ undertaken by actors as they develop policy responses to various dilemmas.  We 
explore this notion in the context of an emerging alternative development discourse called de-growth or 
post-growth (c.f. D’Alisa et al., 2015).  De-growth is a way of thinking about the economy in ways that 
are not growth oriented, or fixated on GDP, but instead focuses on the redistribution of wealth and the 
need to live within the boundaries of the Earth’s ecosystems (Schneider et al., 2010).  In particular we 
bring interpretive institutionalism to bear on the tensions between conventional economic institutions 
and alternative economies.  We explore these ‘points of impact’ through the perspective of a transition 
to a post-growth economy. 
Almost a generation ago ecological modernization was proffered as a panacea that would place global 
society on a sustainable trajectory (Spaargaren and Mol, 1992).  Early efforts to articulate a theory and 
set of practices around ecological modernization held out the possibility of restructuring resource 
production and consumption, especially around technological fixes or innovations, though there were 
some questions around issues broader than technology (Gibbs, 2006).  When policy makers adopted the 
rhetoric of ecological modernization into their practice of ‘greening the economy’, whereby we could 
produce more things with fewer resources, ecological modernization was solidified as a technological fix 
to the environmental problems of the previous generation (Bina, 2013; Spash, 2012; Hajer, 1995).  
Despite high hopes—ours included—that policy makers would develop a ‘strong’ version of ecological 
modernization, which encompassed both ecological concerns and equity issues (Christoff, 1996), 
ecological modernization was largely incorporated by policy makers into existing institutions and policies 
in the form of a ‘business-as-usual’ green economy approach (Bina, 2013).  For many policy makers and 
politicians, the green economy has frequently been seen as a vehicle for renewed economic growth and 
a new source of capital accumulation (Makower and Pike, 2008; Climate Institute and E3G, 2009).  In the 
US, for example, the Obama Administration provided incentives for clean and green energy, with the 
aim of encouraging the development of green businesses, products and services, which in turn would 
create green jobs (ESA, 2012, cited in Caprotti and Bailey, 2014).  Government interest in the green 
economy also arose out of the financial crisis in 2008, which appeared to threaten the whole foundation 
of the capitalist system.  A number of ‘Green New Deals’ were proposed as a way to: transform and re-
regulate the international financial sector; provide an opportunity for state intervention to redirect, or 
at least encourage, restructuring towards new economic forms - i.e. a ‘green’ or ‘low carbon’ economy; 
and finally, to address issues of ‘peak oil’ or the ‘energy crunch’ associated with dependence on oil. 
‘Greening the economy’ in this formulation was about doing more with less, particularly less energy and 
resource inputs.  It did not, however, address the issue of growing consumption or rebound effects 
(Luke, 2008).  While we recognize that ecological modernizing approaches have led to environmental 
gains and improvements (e.g. increased use of renewable energy, greater fuel efficiencies) this must be 
set against a continued trend towards ever greater consumption.   
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Today, this conceptualization of the green economy, in particular, and capitalism, in general, have come 
under scrutiny by a growing number of mainstream scholars, policy makers, activists, and think tanks 
(Demaria et al., 2013). Calling for changes in the way we conceptualize the economy, these groups have 
challenged the centrality of economic growth as an essential part of capitalism (Kubiszewski et al., 2014; 
Jackson, 2009; Hopkins, 2013).  They have also offered critiques of ‘capitalist’ measures of economic 
prosperity.  Whether the focus is upon policy measures, such as how economic activity is measured, the 
need for substantial life style changes in the developed world, or upon the growth of new types of 
business, business organizations, and strategies, it is increasingly recognized that these require some 
kind of systemic change or transition. Such ‘deep’ transformations “will require far reaching innovations 
extending over long periods of time in the technical, social and institutional spheres” (SRU, 2016: 3).  
This includes the claim for sufficiency as a trigger for social innovation that leads to “prosperity with less 
use of nature and materials” (Schneidewind and Zahrnt, 2014: 20) 
 
Geographers, too, have shown a keen interest in identifying and expressing new forms of economic 
activity.  Indeed, some sub-disciplines of geography have commented on economic change for over a 
generation (c.f. Harvey, 1973; Peet, 1977; Smith, 1990).  Traditionally, these analyses focused on micro-
level decision-making, economic sectors, regional innovation, and spatial systems (Hassink et al, 2014).  
More recently, economic geographers have developed their own ways of understanding social change 
and economic development and have drawn extensively from ideas related to cultural studies (Hassink, 
et al., 2014; Boschma and Frenken, 2006; 2011).   There has been growing interest in relational theories 
by economic geographers for the examination of economic and social organization.  The departure from 
individualist (e.g., neoclassical and behavioral) and structuralist (e.g., institutional) approaches have 
been driven by a perceived failure of these approaches to capture the contextually situated social 
processes by which agents and structures co-constitute one another (Jones and Murphy, 2010).  A 
related literature is geographical political economy, where adherents to this approach, or range of 
approaches (Sheppard, 2011), have distanced themselves from structuralist accounts of economy-
society relationships (Amin and Thrift, 2007). Furthermore, proponents of this approach argue that 
capitalism is but one way to organize a society’s economy.  Capitalism may be the dominant discourse, 
but it is not the only system capable of organizing society.  More recently, and building from this 
perspective, is another group of geographers, those who focus on diverse economies.  In this literature, 
scholars not only believe that there are viable alternatives to capitalism, but that they actually exist 
today in practice.  In other words, they examine economic change with a focus on finding alternative 
economic spaces within existing capitalist social relations (McLaren and Agyeman, 2015; Harcourt and 
Nelson, 2015; North, 2015; Gibson-Graham et al., 2013; Jonas, 2013; Jarvis, 2013; Gibson-Graham, 
2008).  For example, North (2015) shows how SMEs ought not to “be associated only with competition, 
economic growth, and profit maximization but also with other value systems: self-actualization, 
sustainability, and community” (North 2015, 14; see also Fuller and Jonas (2002, 2010).  Similarly, Lee 
(2006: 414) notes that “the purification of economic relations in some readings of framing and 
disentanglement of economy misses the inherent complexity of ordinary economies and thereby places 
limits on the economic geographical imagination - and hence on the possibilities of political 
transformation”. 
 
Gibson-Graham et al., (2013, xiii) sum up the common thread of this new generation of scholarship: 
[O]ur economy is the outcome of the decisions we make and the actions we take. We might be 
told that there’s an underlying logic, even a set of natural principles, that direct how economies 
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operate, but most of us can see that the decisions and actions of governments and corporations 
have a lot to do with how economies shape up.   
This paper complements this sensibility in an effort to gain a sharper focus on the inner-workings of 
transitions within existing capitalist relations, and to explore the interstices between the adoption of 
alternative, de-growth development scenarios in existing institutions.  In the quote above, Gibson-
Graham et al. mention the role of government and corporations, and by extension small businesses and 
entrepreneurs.    In terms of alternative economic spaces, where diverse economies can emerge, 
empirical focus is based almost solely on the grassroots movements in the global north (but see 
Midheme, 2015; Midheme and Moulaert, 2013; Curry, 2003).  What we offer here, through the lens of 
constructivist institutional theory (i.e., interpretative institutionalism), is an opportunity to explore the 
potential for alternative economic spaces within the formal structures of governance.  Specifically, we 
make an argument for employing concepts from interpretive institutionalism as the basis for examining 
how, for example, these de-growth ideals and visions articulate with existing economic development 
strategies.  We thus conceptualize institutional change/transition through a framework of ‘meaning 
making’ by agents who create and recreate their milieux as part of broader political-economic contexts.  
The growing discourse of de-growth provides an exciting opportunity to explore institutional issues 
related to economic transitions, in general, and in particular to alternative scenarios in local and regional 
economies.   
The structure of the paper is as follows.  First, we turn to an exploration of interpretative 
institutionalism in more detail, which we propose is a useful means to examine the motivations and 
drivers involved in de-growth initiatives.  Following this, we evaluate de-growth discourses from an 
interpretive institutionalist perspective and then turn specifically to examine de-growth as an alternative 
economic narrative and as the development of a ‘counter-tradition’.  In a subsequent section we outline 
de-growth as it is expressed in the form of local and regional development agendas.  A final section 
provides a conclusion to the paper and identifies two key questions for further research.   
 
II  Interpretative institutionalism as a lens for exploring diverse economies  
Gibson-Graham (1996; 2002; 2008) sought to reveal the ideological commitments that underpin both 
capitalism’s modes of representation and our ability, as scholars, to apprehend them.  She has 
recognized and exposed the role of ideology as it mediates both of these enterprises and thus broken 
the spell of invincibility by rendering it visible and present (cf. Althusser, 1971).  Gibson-Graham (2008: 
623) notes that while exposing the ideology of economic relations does not necessarily produce new 
ways forward, “it can generate new possibilities and different strategies”.  It is through using this space 
of possibility that we offer an analytical approach to explore these alternative economic social relations 
from an institutional perspective.   
 
To date, scholarly work within the economic geography paradigm has identified and characterized the 
factors driving innovation and the green economy(ies) through the lens of firms, sectors, systems of 
governance, and regions. However, despite a growing interest in both the development of the green 
economy and in de-growth initiatives, much less attention has been focused on how these initiatives are 
both shaped by, and impact on, existing institutional contexts. Here, institutions are both codified norms 
(e.g., laws, regulations, etc…) and all other societal framework conditions including: beliefs, attitudes, 
and lifestyles, as they are inherent parts of a potential de-growth transition. Swyngedouw (2014: 92) 
comments that it is “the political’ that represents the core challenge if de-growth is intended to 
represent a more fundamental transformation of current growth logics”.  From this perspective de-
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growth needs to be politicized in order to produce a ‘new common sense’ around the notion of finite 
resources and de-growth objectives such as social and environmental justice. This common sense can 
only emerge from a new symbolic order, the creation of which will be the result of both political and 
discursive articulation.  The development of the new common sense therefore involves the ideological 
dimension of decision-making, i.e. the way in which individual actor behavior is simultaneously 
influenced by, and contributes to, the construction of prevailing/hegemonic reference systems. This 
means that we will tack back and forth freely between what some scholars call ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
institutions (North, 1990).   
 
A constructivist framework for understanding institutions 
In this section of the paper we turn our attention to how actors frame and articulate alternative de-
growth strategies within existing institutional contexts.  Bevir and Rhodes (2001: 21) capture this notion 
in their general discussion of state actors operating in the face of change: 
 
… state-actors construct both their understanding of the pressures or dilemmas, and 
also the policies they adopt in response to them, in perhaps different ways depending 
on the background of which they do so.  Proponents… rightly emphasize the unintended 
consequences of neoliberal reforms: they show how the outcome of the reforms 
depends on negotiations between different organizations.  A decentered approach 
would add to this recognition of how the reforms and responses to them reflect a 
contest of meanings between different actors inspired by different traditions and 
responding subtly to different dilemmas.   
 
Thus, these arguments render problematic the notion that institutions arise from given inputs, pressures 
and policies (Bevir and Rhodes, 2012). In the context of this paper, ideologies are behind the 
appearances that correspond to representations of so-called capitalist realities. Opening up these 
representations is the hard work that has been accomplished by Gibson-Graham. In doing so this has 
cleared the way for exploring the role of actors working within institutions (see also the remarkably 
detailed work of Emilianoff and Stegassy (2010), who traced numerous actors across Europe in order to 
understand their motivation for, and contributions to, urban sustainability strategies).   
 
In order to understand transitions beyond their objectified artifacts therefore (e.g., GDP, defined roles 
of the state, sufficiency) and tangible outcomes (e.g. indicator based monitoring) we argue that we need 
a conceptual framework to understand the actor-focused social processes that affect their material 
expression.  For example, while de-growth strategies have notions of social justice as a stated goal, 
these goals do not have objective status – they do not apply equally across space and in place – and to 
understand how they are expressed in localities and regions we need a specialized analytical language 
and conceptual references.  An interpretive institutionalist approach suggests that institutions are 
important analytical entry points for de-growth scenarios because they reveal the social and cultural 
embeddedness of our most tacit assumptions about relationships, as well as providing a key for 
understanding historical change.  Douglass North (1990: 3) captured this notion well, when he 
suggested, “institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to 
understanding historical change.”  Yet, institutions are not objects without social origins or ideologies.  A 
contemporary view of institutions that comes from post-structuralist and network theory posits that 
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institutions are not just containers of historical perspectives and actions, rather they focus on the 
dynamic and contingent role of actors in shaping institutional responses (González and Healey, 2005).  In 
particular, this view focuses on the social construction of networks and the ability of individuals to use 
these networks to create meanings contingently (Irazábal, 2005).  For Irazábal (2005: 44) a common 
problem for institutional analyses is that “institutional analyses depict actors as if the people within 
them are bound to follow predetermined procedures or rules, rather than respond to them through 
their own contingent agency.”   
 
However, “ideas on their own cannot influence the shape of institutions…ideas need carriers - 
individuals and interest groups - who advocate in their favor, and develop strategies for their 
promotion” (Lowndes, 2005: 297).  Outcomes and agendas will be shaped by struggles, conflicts, 
encounters and resistance (González and Healey, 2005; Lowndes, 2005).  The interpretative 
institutionalist framework is able to address these issues through providing a rigorous and insightful 
analytical framework. In this manner institutional analysis is exposed to sources of power, gender 
inequity, politics of science and the like.  Institutional analyses may also punctuate the permeable 
membrane that exists amongst the variety of actors involved in transitions towards de-growth 
strategies. There are conceptual differences involved in adopting this form of institutional analysis – 
while there is no space here to be exhaustive in our analysis, we will focus on two that are relevant here.  
First, an interpretive analysis of institutions enables a shift away from a meta-narrative based on taken-
for-granted assumptions about economic growth.  Rather, the analytical entry point begins from a view 
that institutions are constituted by a discursive debate based on actors’ differing beliefs (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2001).  Second, an interpretive analysis therefore requires a closer understanding of those 
actors involved in the process of transforming institution-economy relationships.  Both of these points 
reflect the epistemology of the geography of political economy (Sheppard, 2011) and the disrupted 
account offered by Gibson-Graham.   
 
The analytical approach of interpretive institutionalism is framed by three key concepts, beliefs, 
traditions and dilemmas, which reflect a post-positivist sensibility that questions a priori assumptions 
about human behavior.  The concept of beliefs allows researchers to explore and explain actions and/or 
outcomes by giving analytical priority to the ways individuals construct their world “including the ways 
they understand their location, the norms that affect them and their interests” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 
6).  Second, tradition is the social context in which an actor exercises their own reason and acts (Bevir, 
1999; Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). However, Bevir and Rhodes take care not to essentialise traditions and 
argue that such actors are situated agents in traditions. Their use of the concept of tradition derives 
from a rejection of positivism, which holds that individuals are transhistorical (e.g. utility maximizers).  
Tradition is thus seen as a concept that can both capture the unique perspective of actors (e.g. social 
heritage, particular inherited theories) and also provides the opportunity to measure linkages between 
ideas and policy outcomes. Traditions are themselves the construct of situated agencies (see Barnes, 
1996).  Bevir and Rhodes argue that the contexts that make up traditions do not determine outcomes, 
they only influence them.  Indeed, “every time a person applies a tradition they have to understand it 
afresh in present-day circumstances” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 8).  Dilemmas are the final concept to be 
used, wherein  “a dilemma arises for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to 
existing beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated 
tradition” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 9).  Dilemmas require situated agents, or coalitions of them, to 
articulate and act upon them - they are not objective in the world. Changes in individuals’ beliefs, 
actions and social practices can only be understood by investigating the ways they respond to, and 
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conceive, dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 1999).  Bevir and Rhodes also suggest that dilemmas arise out of 
both experiences and theoretical and moral reflection.  Finally, Bevir and Rhodes argue that the 
solutions that arise from these dilemmas are often inconsistent with a tradition.  Thus, traditions 
provide a guide as to what might happen, rather than what will happen.  “Indeed, when people think 
they are merely continuing a settled tradition or practice, they might well be developing, adjusting and 
changing it” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 10).   
 
Our main purpose in this discussion has been to argue for and propose an interpretive account of 
institutions as a way to explore the potential for the development of de-growth policies and actions 
within the realm of formal institutional structures (though the framework of interpretative 
institutionalism could also be used to explain the emergence of grassroots activities).  Such an approach 
to the study of institutions, “explores the way [an institution] is created, sustained or modified through 
the ideas and actions of individuals” (Bevir and Rhodes, 1999: 225).  The actions of individuals are 
therefore not governed by their institutional position or institutional rules, rather we need to look at 
“how meanings and actions, are created, recreated, and changed in ways that produce and transform 
institutions” (Bevir, 2003: 460).  Institutions, like economic actors or firms, are the creation of broader 
social processes as well as the agency of actors working to construct them and act through them.  
Institutions can be seen not just as administrative and political organizations, but also as “the rules, 
norms and practices, which structure areas of social endeavor” (Coaffee and Healey, 2003: 1982).  
Hence, “institutional rules may be consciously designed and clearly specified (as in structural plans and 
operating procedures) or take the form of unwritten customs and conventions (as in aspects of 
‘professionalism’ or ‘departmentalism’)” (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 632).  Similarly, DiGaetano and 
Strom (2003: 372) suggest that “political actors are the carriers of culture, and their understanding of 
the structural context and institutional milieu is affected by the values and beliefs that they hold.”  Thus 
agency alone is not of much interest.  An interpretivist account “encourages us to examine the ways 
social life, institutions and policies are created, sustained and modified by individuals acting upon beliefs 
that are not given to them by the institution itself or a universal rationality” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006: 
461). 
 
Interpretive institutionalism presents an opportunity to examine new sources of diverse economies, 
particularly those that come from within ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions.  The concepts of dilemmas, 
traditions, and beliefs provide a constructivist account of how different actors make meaning from 
perceived dilemmas that they face.  It also allows for the deconstruction of actors along the lines of the 
traditions that they operate in, as well as their personal belief systems.  We should note here that we 
are not interested in repositioning the state or formal institutions as the drivers of economic and social 
change.  Rather, those spaces where actors struggle to construct meaning about the situations they find 
themselves in represent only one of many possible ways that alternative economic spaces could 
emerge.   
 
III De-growth discourses as a catalyst for emerging diverse economies   
 
In the previous section, we presented details of an interpretive institutionalist approach to 
understanding economies and actors within them.  We now turn our attention to the emergent 
alternative form of economic activity of de-growth.  This is both a decentered grassroots movement, 
especially in France, Italy, and Spain, but is also entering mainstream debates about changing the way 
we construct and measure value in the economy.  The concept of de-growth has fascinating potential.  It 
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differs from both sustainable development and ecological modernization in that it sees limits to growth, 
both in terms of ecological limits, as well as social limits.  Further, it is reflected in a variety of discourses, 
not only through a growing number of grassroots initiatives, but also amongst policy makers and 
economic thinkers.  In the discussion that follows we present de-growth as an alternative space for 
conceiving economic relations.  We try to show how discourses around the notion of de-growth 
simultaneously contribute to the construction of dilemmas and to the exploration of new approaches, 
possibly replacing operant traditions and beliefs. 
 
Constructing dilemmas 
New visions for producing economic prosperity have emerged, especially around the relationship 
between prosperity and growth.  Through the course of this process scholars and practitioners have 
identified new dilemmas such as social well-being.  For example, in 2009 Tim Jackson developed a 
sustained argument regarding the spurious connection between economic growth and prosperity, 
whereby prosperity is not synonymous with income or wealth: 
 
Our technologies, our economy and our social aspirations are all mis-aligned with any 
meaningful expression of prosperity. The vision of social progress that drives us – based 
on the continual expansion of material wants – is fundamentally untenable. And this 
failing is not a simple falling short from utopian ideals. It is much more basic. In pursuit of 
the good life today, we are systematically eroding the basis for well-being tomorrow 
(Jackson, 2009: 2).  
 
In a similar vein, Kubiszewski et al. (2014) propose that Gross Domestic Product as a measure of 
prosperity is outdated and too narrow in its focus: 
 
GDP measures mainly market transactions. It ignores social costs, environmental 
impacts and income inequality. If a business used GDP-style accounting, it would aim to 
maximize gross revenue — even at the expense of profitability, efficiency, sustainability 
or flexibility. That is hardly smart or sustainable (think Enron). Yet since the end of the 
Second World War, promoting GDP growth has remained the primary national policy 
goal in almost every country (Kubiszewki et al., 2014: 283). 
They go on to note that we currently have access to more sophisticated indicators for measuring a 
prosperous and worthwhile life:  
The environmental and social effects of GDP growth can be estimated, as can the effects 
of income inequality. The psychology of human well-being can now be surveyed 
comprehensively and quantitatively. A plethora of experiments has produced 
alternative measures of progress (Kubizewki et al., 2014: 283). 
Similarly, policy makers at a variety of spatial scales are mobilizing new indices, such as the Human 
Development Index, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, or OECD’s Better Life Initiative that 
privilege other non-growth aspects of prosperity (c.f. Sen, 1999; Jackson, 2009; Stiglitz, 2012; Stiglitz, et 
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al. 2009).  At the local and regional scales, the process of ‘EcoBudget’ has been employed as a process-
oriented set of indicators designed to engage with thinking about the social and ecological 
consequences of local authority decisions (Elgert and Krueger, 2012).  In total, then, the dilemma has 
shifted away from a concern with addressing the ecological impacts of economic development towards 
a broader focus on issues of well-being and social justice. 
 
Operant traditions and beliefs 
A growing number of economists, policy makers, scholars, and many in civil society, have increasingly 
provided a critique of our current economic system and its future course.  A number of fundamental 
issues have arisen, or been revisited, in the light of the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath.  These 
include concerns over growing levels of inequality within and between nation states and the seeming 
inability of the current economic system to deliver greater equity (Sen, 1999; Stiglitz, 2012).  In terms of 
natural resources (e.g. peak oil, precious metals, water availability), and the productivity of human 
labor, several authors have questioned whether the current form of capitalism has reached its capacity 
for material growth (Daly, 1996; Sen, 1999; Jackson, 2009, 2011).  Increasingly, in some quarters of civil 
society, there is also a perception that there are material and ideological limits to growth.  In Germany, 
for example, a survey commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation reported that eight out of ten 
Germans would prefer an alternative economic order (Heflich, 2010).   According to the study, the 
proportion of Germans who believe growth to be very important was down 14% compared with two 
years before. In addition, the proportion of Germans who highly value money and possessions also 
dropped. Nearly two-thirds disagreed with the idea that a higher income could increase their quality of 
life.  In addition, according to these findings, many Germans now value protection of the environment 
over material prosperity (The Guardian, September 19, 2012).  This would suggest that at least some 
publics are revisiting the question of ‘growth’ for the first time in over a generation.  
 
In France, Serge Latouche has popularized the concept of décroissance, or de-growth.  Latouche’s work 
lays out a fairly coherent, if imperfect, strategy for achieving prosperity without growth and in this paper 
we use ‘de-growth’ as a collective term to refer to alternative paradigms (c.f. Latouche, 2006; 2010).   
De-growth focuses on sustaining people, communities, and nature and from this perspective these 
should form the core goals of economic activity, and not simply be the by-products associated with 
conventional GDP.  Similarly, for Speth (2009), de-growth means encouraging new business models, 
aimed at meeting social needs and rebuilding natural capital.  Although Speth’s focus is on business, his 
view differs from the more conventional connotations in that it is focused on intensive, rather than 
extensive growth.  For example, one measure of growth would be the extent to which local businesses 
use local labor and raw/recycled materials.  The notion is to explicitly couple economic activity with 
human well-being and environmental performance.  Similar notions are captured by other approaches 
that echo the de-growth perspective, albeit that they may not share the more radical implications. For 
example, for Porter and Kramer (2011: 64), ‘shared value’ provides a conceptual framework for a form 
of de-growth capitalism: 
 
The concept of shared value—which focuses on the connections between societal and 
economic progress—has the power to unleash the next wave of global growth…  Every 
firm should look at decisions and opportunities through the lens of shared value.  This 
will lead to new approaches that generate greater innovation and growth for 
companies—and also greater benefits for society.  
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In outlining the rise of these dilemmas over the direction of capitalist development, we have shown how 
these are informed by a tradition of measuring policy failures.  Indeed, the hegemony of GDP as an 
indicator has been challenged in a variety of quarters.  Complementing this is the effort to determine 
how to redefine and reconfigure economic activity, how to create alternative de-growth scenarios, and 
how to utilize new definitions of prosperity (Bauhardt, 2014).  These emergent alternative scenarios 
have an emphasis on spreading prosperity more equitably, and developing appropriate economic 
institutions and value structures to support this effort.  It seems, then, that there is an emphasis on 
creating profitability or prosperity through the very production of benefits to society and the 
environment.  Of course over the last 30 years we have seen and experienced other alternative 
scenarios which have appeared to challenge the direction and definition of mainstream development – 
indeed the initial enthusiasm over sustainable development and ecological modernization immediately 
come to mind.  Yet, despite their different priorities, unlike de-growth critiques, advocates of ecological 
modernization and sustainable development largely shied away from challenging the growth 
‘imperative’ (Schulz and Bailey, 2014; Kallis, 2011).  In contrast, de-growth challenges the tradition of 
growth at all costs.  In particular, scholars question the ability of technological innovation to overcome 
the Earth’s biophysical limits (Demaria et al., 2013).  Furthermore, as we have seen in other sectors (c.f. 
North, 2015; North and Nurse 2014; Fuller and Jonas, 2010), the actually diverse logics of a growth-
centric sector open up new opportunities to develop economic spaces that are more socially and 
environmentally just. 
 
IV  Constructing counter-traditions:  De-growth as an alternative economic narrative 
In this section we develop our argument further by examining how de-growth advocates are creating a 
‘counter-tradition’.  They are taking the dilemma that comes from conventional analyses (e.g. the 
perceived failure of the capitalist growth regime to redistribute wealth, how to care for host 
communities, how to maintain ecological integrity), and developing new traditions for understanding 
and reacting to them (Schneider et al. 2010).  De-growth in the context of this discussion should not be 
taken to mean economic ‘shrinkage’ (e.g. as a result of demographic change) or recession (decreasing 
economic performance). Rather, it should be understood as a departure from dominant growth 
paradigms in the sense of Latouche's décroissance, which rejects the maxim that private and societal 
prosperity can only be ensured via a continuous growth of materially and monetarily measurable 
economic performance — irrespective of negative externalities or the finite availability of resources and 
ecological sustainability. Thus “sustainable degrowth may be defined as an equitable downscaling of 
production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the 
local and global level, in the short and long term” (Schneider et al., 2010: 512).  The formulation 
‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson 2009), neatly captures the orientation of a transition towards 
sustainable lifestyles and economic systems envisioned by the de-growth concept.  A core difference 
from its predecessor narratives is that de-growth places a strong emphasis on the issue of distributive 
justice in growth and wealth, both at the level of international and development policies and within 
individual national economies (see also related debates on ‘pro-poor-growth’ (Rippin, 2012)).  De-
growth is thus more than a simple ‘ecological limits’ or erstwhile ‘limits to growth’ debate, rather it 
represents a re-framing of the very definition of economic prosperity towards enhancing well-being and 
human happiness (Whitehead, 2013). 
 
Latouche has been particularly influential in developing the principle of décroissance and in promoting 
the rejection of growth-oriented forms of production and consumption patterns, a stance that has 
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resonated particularly strongly with the Italian, Spanish and French sustainability movements (Latouche, 
2006; 2010). The de-growth narrative includes developmental and global-political dimensions, i.e. 
viewing resource exploitation in relation to environmental justice and social equity on a global level, 
rather than just through an ecological lens. Indeed, Latouche (2010) has argued that the ‘global south’ 
above all is capable of realizing breakthroughs into new economic systems and alternatives to the 
Western market maxim, and that the ‘global north’, by reducing its claim on resources, could create 
maneuvering space for development in the south.  
 
Latouche and the décroissance community explicitly disassociate themselves from other models of 
transition, such as ecological modernization, which consider a shift to sustainable economies to be 
possible within present market principles (Demaria et al., 2013). Indeed, ecological modernization has 
been roundly criticized by degrowth analysts for its belief in the viability of continuous – though 
decelerated or just different – growth (Kallis, 2011). Critical assessments of mainstream climate policies 
and the failures of carbon markets (Bailey et al., 2011; Böhm et al., 2012; Redclift, 2009) have also 
suggested systemic shortcomings in the kinds of reformed growth proposed by ecological 
modernization. Kindred concepts such as ‘smart growth’ or the ambiguous term ‘qualitative growth’ 
(increasing the profitability of enterprises without increased use of resources) are also widely criticized 
for taking insufficient account of the core problems of the current growth paradigm.  In contrast, the 
décroissance approach posits a need for a more holistic view of the socio-cultural dimensions of growth 
that includes consideration of values, norms, consumption patterns and the like; décroissance is an 
ecological-democratic project. Here, the concept of efficiency can be contrasted with that of sufficiency, 
illustrated by Latouche’s variety of ‘Rs’ (e.g. réévaluer, réduire, recycler, réutiliser, restructurer, 
redistribuer (revalue, reduce, recycle, reuse, restructure and redistribute)). It deals with the question of 
how, particularly in the global north, material consumption can be reduced without impairing the 
satisfaction and well-being of the population, while at the same time contributing to improved living 
conditions in economically underprivileged segments of the population and regions via a fairer 
distribution of resources. In this context, discussions over material property and the commodification or 
non-commodification of goods and services acquire particular importance. 
 
The principle of sufficiency does not fundamentally question the necessity for growth but, rather, 
concerns itself with the question of which activities, product groups, services and forms of consumption 
are likely to generate future economic growth, and which segments of the population should benefit 
from growth effects, utilizing ideas of distributive justice (Princen, 2005). In contrast to the efficiency 
hypothesis, however, it is not assumed that such adjustments should occur exclusively according to the 
principles of the market economy. Instead, sufficiency seeks more profound social changes in terms of 
consumption preferences, lifestyles and political priorities (e.g. research policy, public procurement, 
fiscal policy and incentive tools) (for an overview see Schneidewind and Zahrnt, 2014).  It is important to 
be clear that the sufficiency approach should not be interpreted either as an attempt to generalize 
idealistic lifestyles of individual self-restraint (e.g. dietary, consumption or mobility behavior) or as top-
down, state-imposed limitations on consumption. Rather, it holds some potential as a novel, 
paradigmatic model of future social and economic decision-making which can aid in assessing the long-
term effects of investments and governance mechanisms on resource consumption and other negative 
growth externalities and social distribution. While analogies with some of the principles of sustainable 
development are evident in the sufficiency concept, it may prove less problematic to operationalize in 
some respects (assuming some agreement is possible on the definition and calibration of the term 
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‘sufficient’) and may offer fewer opportunities for one-sided interpretations that skew the concept 
towards economic concerns (Redclift, 2009).   
 
With this important caveat in mind, Latouchian notions of de-growth signify a conscious departure from 
the traditional concepts of material and monetary issues within growth towards an orientation that 
emphasizes development strategies based on long-term viability and global distributive justice. The 
latter goes far beyond the mere redistribution of monetary wealth but, instead, comprises a more 
complex conceptualization of poverty eradication that includes, but is not restricted to, equal 
opportunities, health, quality of life and environment, and political participation.  Finally, unlike its 
predecessors, de-growth is an explicitly state-centered approach to organizing economic activity.  Of 
course, the assumption is that the people in the state will make better decisions than consumers, but 
the idea is that social justice and distributional equity are not left to the whims of the market.   
 
Toward de-growth scenarios 
 
We define alternative scenarios based around de-growth principles as those economic activities that 
bring the transformative promise of a truly different way of doing business as they dynamically engage 
with existing social relations.  For example, O’Neill and Gibbs (2016) point to how some green 
entrepreneurs combine business and environmental goals in a drive toward greater sustainability, 
seeking to achieve the ethical transformation of their business sector (cf. Isaak, 1998; Tilley and Parrish, 
2006).  Similarly, the notion of ‘just sustainabilities’ provides another vision for a de-growth scenario as 
it adopts alternative indices for quality of life that redirects business-as-usual explicitly towards broader 
social goals (Agyeman, 2013; Agyeman and Angus, 2003). We must underscore, however, that for us de-
growth scenarios need to include a much more explicit social component.  While some elements of de-
growth scenarios may seem similar to more mainstream conceptualisations (e.g. UNEP’s definition1 of a 
green economy which focuses mainly upon carbon reduction, energy efficiency and resource 
management), de-growth scenarios must have goals or a policy statement that requires, for example, 
firms not to acquire materials from sources that unethically exploit human labor or place a higher 
burden of risk on those harvesting the materials.  In other words, a true de-growth scenario must, from 
the outset, represent the ideal, not merely valorize one traditional form of capital over another.  For 
example, research on sustainable cities has shown that while some cities are becoming ‘more 
sustainable’ in terms of a variety of green or environmental indices, they are becoming less socially just, 
and, moreover, these green benefits are accrued at the cost of someone else’s economic security and 
dignity (Mössner, 2013; Rosol, 2013).  In many ways the rhetoric here echoes the calls for sustainable 
development and its implementation at the local scale through Local Agenda 21 from twenty years ago. 
De-growth scenarios, in principle, must adhere to the tripartite concerns of sustainable development:  
economic prosperity, ecological integrity, and social equity.     
Financial shocks to the global economy in 2008 were understood as institutional failures that witnessed 
massive inequities in the redistribution of wealth, wholesale destruction of the Earth’s ecological 
systems, and increasing community vulnerability.  They have inspired academics and policy makers - 
instead of relying on traditional methods to measure the crisis - to begin adopting counter traditions to 
                                                 
1 In its simplest expression, a green economy is low-carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive. In a 
green economy, growth in income and employment are driven by public and private investments that 
reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. (UNEP, 2011: 16) 
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evaluate the extent of the dilemma posed by the financial crisis.  This has given new momentum to 
discussions about de-growth scenarios—or alternative economic spaces—which we sought to describe 
above.  To try and ground this further we now turn our attention to de-growth scenarios in local and 
regional practice. 
 
V  De-Growth expressed in local and regional development agendas 
 
Thus far we have defined the de-growth paradigm and identified its key components, outlining its 
potential for creating alternative economic spaces.  However, we are also interested in examining how 
these de-growth ideals take on material form, particularly at the local and regional scale.  Although de-
growth proponents are aware that action is needed at all scales, many existing activities occur at the 
local and urban scales (Demaria et al., 2013).  Amongst other things, we are interested in local and 
regional strategies for moving towards decentralized sufficiency, the de-commercialization of goods and 
services, and social enterprises and solidarity economies that seek to create synergies between local 
private and public actors to offer new services, workplace opportunities and proximity services (Schulz 
and Bailey, 2014).  Such initiatives fit with a view of de-growth as being not just an ideological and 
economic concept, but one that articulates with political and radical action (Demaria et al., 2013).  Table 
1 provides an outline of the key components of a de-growth approach, gives some examples of the 
forms in which they might be implemented and details the spatial articulation of these. They range from 
alternative models of business organization (e.g. the renaissance of cooperatives in various sectors) and 
financial instruments to the crucial question of the way we ‘measure’ economic success and social 
welfare. Admittedly, not all of the listed activities may have de-growth principles as their core 
motivation or driver. The success of car and bike sharing systems around the globe, for example, initially 
launched as local community initiatives in a small number of cities, have subsequently turned this 
activity into an increasingly commercialized endeavor attracting large companies such as BMW (e.g. 
DriveNow).  Micro-credits – initially applauded as the key to poverty reduction and symbolically 
crowned with the Nobel Peace Award assigned to Grameen Bank’s founder Muhammad Yunus, are 
today widely criticized for bad management, misuse, and a growing engagement of profit-oriented 
corporations in the microfinance industry. David Harvey cynically labeled them as the “subprime of all 
subprime forms of lending” (2012: 86) both for potentially negative impacts for the mortgage holder as 
well as for the unequal distribution of benefits increasingly allocated in the industrialized world.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
However, despite reservations over some, what all these initiatives have in common is that they – to 
some extent – try to uncouple economic success from quantitative growth and increasing resource 
intensity. In doing so, they not only attempt to transform established product life cycles, ways of 
production and their spatial organization, but also question the primary objectives of economic 
activities, i.e. the choice is between established and profit maximizing approaches and alternative 
business models, which target welfare and distributive justice-oriented objectives. Very often, these 
alternative scenarios are initiated by local actors in distinct policy arrangements, and create niches at 
the grassroots level before gaining momentum by either disseminating to other places (e.g. the 
Transition Initiatives network, see Hobson et al., 2016) and/or by increasingly entering mainstream 
activities (e.g. successful local low carbon initiatives influencing fundamental shifts in national 
renewable energy policies) (Seyfang and Smith, 2007).  Table 2 provides details of a number of indicative 
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initiatives that have been developed at the local and regional scale based around de-growth principles.  
Here the de-growth movement has strong connections with other movements such as bio-regionalism, 
permaculture, transition initiatives, slow food, local currencies, voluntary simplicity and proponents of 
renewable energies (Whitehead, 2013).  Many activities occur at the local scale, articulated through 
formal and informal networks, such as Transition Initiatives or the CittàSlow movement (Demaria et al., 
2013). 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
As both the preceding conceptual sections and these specific examples of de-growth scenarios in 
practice show, there is a need for regional analysts to not only join the respective scholarly debates, but 
also to recognize that they can enrich the latter with up-to-date conceptualizations of space, as well as 
with their methodological expertise in addressing local and regional contexts.  Against the backdrop of 
de-growth imperatives, an adoption of concepts such as interpretative institutionalism is promising in its 
potential to better understand the underlying practices and decision making processes involved, and 
how they are both highly contextualized and strongly embedded into societal debates and changes. 
Such an approach thus allows idiosyncratic in-depth studies, which may – to a certain extent – also lead 
to preliminary generalizations. The latter will not only be fruitful for international debates on 
appropriate concepts, but might also help to further theorize sustainability transitions.  Utilizing an 
interpretative institutionalist approach allows us to explore the actual motivations, assumptions, and (if 
applicable) fears of individual actors and their performativity regarding institutional change.  
 
VII Conclusion 
 
In the discussion above we described how previous work sought to close the false dichotomy between 
specifically ‘capitalist’ social forms and ‘non-capitalist’ ones.  In contrast to those neoliberal scholars 
who suggest that there are no alternatives, we would argue that there are plenty of actually existing 
alternatives.  Indeed, following Gibson-Graham, the problem does not lie in the absence of alternatives.  
One of the key points of this work was to show that viable and principled alternatives to capitalist social 
relations, such as the many local and regional de-growth initiatives conceived worldwide, is not where 
the ‘transition’ problem lies. Instead, we argue that it is our analytical perspective that needs to shift so 
we can both realize the existence of these alternatives and understand them as they operate within a 
larger system of capitalist social dynamics.  Building off of our previous theoretical work, in this paper 
we have presented an actor-centered approach, interpretative institutionalism, to examine these 
dynamics.   
 
However, these principled ideas will be brought into a diverse array of social and policy milieux with 
different actors acting as ‘change agents’.  Interpretative institutionalism can thus provide a framework 
for understanding how these ideas are woven together with existing policies from the perspective of the 
actors involved in that process.  Understanding how this occurs could assist in the implementation of de-
growth strategies and policies.  For example, we can see it expressed in ‘Transition Initiatives’, which are 
emerging in Europe and North America (see www.transitionnetwork.org).  What is less clear, and which 
the interpretive institutionalist approach can elucidate, is how these new alternative ideas are shaped 
once they arrive into an existing institutional milieu.  Indeed, how these initiatives play out once they 
engage with existing economies may not lead to positive outcomes.  One example of this is the so-called 
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sharing-economy - an attempt to overcome traditions and beliefs. Although starting from a de-growth 
oriented search for equitable and resource-efficient co-use of infrastructures, goods, services and 
knowledge, the recent proliferation of certain parts of this sector risks creating a new dilemma while 
attempting to solve an existing one. This notably applies to internet-based peer-to-peer activities which, 
in shaping new, largely unregulated markets, have attracted investors following more traditional ideas 
of profit maximization and surplus allocation. Many of the big players in this so-called platform economy 
(e.g. Airbnb, Uber) thus tend to create what Martin has called “a nightmarish form of neoliberalism” 
rather than a potential pathway to sustainability (Martin, 2016: 149). 
 
Thus the ambiguity of activities such as the sharing economy approach gives an idea of the potential 
destinies of what seemed initially sensible de-growth concepts as they become subject to variegated 
interpretations. We argue that such outcomes call for a more differentiated and critical assessment. In 
this paper, we have argued that an interpretive institutionalist perspective can reveal new insights into 
how alternative development scenarios ‘map on’ to existing local and regional political and institutional 
contexts.  It has the potential to complement existing political economic explanations by looking beyond 
institutional form and incorporating agents’ understanding of the ‘green economic opportunities’ in 
their own political and economic milieu.  This work may thus produce a better understanding of the 
factors that influence moves towards a de-growth agenda in local and regional economies. 
 
Finally, the variegated concerns over creating alternative development scenarios, in general, and de-
growth, in particular, raise two important issues.  First, it challenges a fundamental assumption of 
economics, and by scholars of economic systems in general and economic geography in particular—that 
there is a growth imperative (see Schulz and Bailey, 2014).  As we have suggested, critical assessments 
of the green economy, green growth, and the like have shown that these new forms of economic 
development need not have a ‘de-growth’ sensibility.   Rather, it’s old wine in new bottles.  Caprotti 
(2012; 2016), for instance, observes that some of the green economy’s front-line actors, like the 
cleantech investment sector, utilize discursive logics that, although they focus on resource and energy 
efficiency and low carbon outcomes, also explicitly emphasize the potential for growth, and profit 
maximization by investors and entrepreneurs.  At the local and regional scale there have also been 
attempts by city-regions and whole countries to position themselves as leaders in green economy 
innovation as a means of stimulating growth2 (Davies and Mullin, 2011; Gibbs and O’Neill, 2014; 
McCauley and Stephens, 2012).  Similarly, urban sustainability initiatives, such as new urbanism and 
smart growth in the US, have relied solely on the market, both as an initial rationalization and to 
subsequently address  the distributional issues that emerge after these developments are completed.  
This further reinforces the view that while, in practical terms, the main currents of contemporary 
thinking about the green economy are increasingly flowing towards new conceptualizations (or at least 
portrayals) of economic growth, they remain focused on the potential for (renewed) economic growth. 
More fundamentally even, scholars in these fields not only need to reconsider existing conceptual 
approaches regarding their appropriateness to critically assess growth-related dimensions of their study 
objects. They might also need to reflect upon the foundational beliefs and traditions marking our 
disciplines which are also reflected by the terminology in use. Starting with operational terms such as 
‘innovation’ or ‘organization’ which might be too narrowly defined, this terminological reflection should 
expand to key notions such as ‘development’ or ‘economy’. A broadened understanding of the latter 
                                                 
2 See Clean Edge (2012) for an explicit outline of how some US metros are seen as leaders in the new green 
economy. 
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seems to be a pivotal precondition for making the complexity of actually existing diverse economies 
accessible to research. Obviously, this would have strong methodological implications as to the data and 
indicators we use and the way we interact with the ‘researched’ to understand underlying motivations, 
framings and performative dimensions of practices. 
 
The second issue relates to how alternative development scenarios are articulated in practice in 
localities and regions around the world.  Obviously a first point to make is that there is currently no de-
growth regime, in whole or in part, in place.  While aspirations towards this might exist among certain 
actors in localities and regions as we outlined in the previous section, we have no sense of how these 
ideas, when introduced, become transformed by local and regional economic development politics.  
What seems obvious though is the fact that in many industrialized countries local de-growth initiatives 
have reached a critical number, resonating in the media and political sphere as a new social movement, 
currently trying to build-up platforms, networks and umbrella organizations to strengthen their visibility 
and political weight. If not part of the movement themselves, an increasing number of scholars are 
attracted by the current dynamics of these initiatives (e.g. the Research and Degrowth network, see 
www.degrowth.org or the De-Growth graduate school (Postwachstumskolleg)) at the University of Jena, 
Germany, and have started to more systematically monitor this development. They hence contribute to 
what Gibson-Graham, when developing their work on diverse economies, claimed as a performative 
ontological project: “to produce a discourse of economic difference as a contribution to a politics of 
economic innovation” (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 614). 
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